Related papers: Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff D…

For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis, food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand, aggregation systems have been extremely successful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g., Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply…

Empowerment has the potential to help agents learn large skillsets, but is not yet a scalable solution for training general-purpose agents. Recent empowerment methods learn diverse skillsets by maximizing the mutual information between…

Multi-agent decision problems are typically solved via distributed iterative algorithms, where the agents only communicate between themselves on a peer-to-peer network. Each agent usually maintains a copy of each decision variable, while…

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…

In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff…

Deploying large language model (LLM) agents in shared environments introduces a fundamental tension between individual alignment and collective stability: locally rational decisions can impose negative externalities that degrade…

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic…

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve inflated scores on multiple-choice tasks by exploiting inherent biases in option positions or labels, rather than demonstrating genuine understanding. This study introduces SCOPE, an evaluation…

We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…

We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs). An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and an…

In order to understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pair-wise competition outcomes in competitive human competitions we introduce a new multiplayer resource allocation game, the Population Lotto…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…

We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

Structured Latent Attribute Models (SLAMs) are a family of discrete latent variable models widely used in education, psychology, and epidemiology to model multivariate categorical data. A SLAM assumes that multiple discrete latent…

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…

Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…

We propose a new sequential Efficient Pseudo-Likelihood (k-EPL) estimator for dynamic discrete choice games of incomplete information. k-EPL considers the joint behavior of multiple players simultaneously, as opposed to individual responses…

Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social system dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all…

In many real-world large-scale decision problems, self-interested agents have individual dynamics and optimize their own long-term payoffs. Important examples include the competitive access to shared resources (e.g., roads, energy, or…