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Multi-agent reinforcement learning is a challenging and active field of research due to the inherent nonstationary property and coupling between agents. A popular approach to modeling the multi-agent interactions underlying the multi-agent…
A major challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) is the curse of multiagents, where the size of the joint action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. This remains to be a bottleneck for designing efficient MARL…
An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…
We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from…
We propose a new model, independent linear Markov game, for multi-agent reinforcement learning with a large state space and a large number of agents. This is a class of Markov games with independent linear function approximation, where each…
While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental…
The sim-to-real gap, where agents trained in a simulator face significant performance degradation during testing, is a fundamental challenge in reinforcement learning. Extansive works adopt the framework of distributionally robust RL, to…
Multi-agent learning algorithms have been shown to display complex, unstable behaviours in a wide array of games. In fact, previous works indicate that convergent behaviours are less likely to occur as the total number of agents increases.…
In real-world multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) applications, agents may not have perfect state information (e.g., due to inaccurate measurement or malicious attacks), which challenges the robustness of agents' policies. Though…
Robust Reinforcement Learning (RL) focuses on improving performances under model errors or adversarial attacks, which facilitates the real-life deployment of RL agents. Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) is one of the most…
For a risk-averse finite-horizon Markov Decision Problem, we introduce a special class of Markov coherent risk measures, called mini-batch measures. We also define the class of multipattern risk-averse problems that generalizes the class of…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…
Reinforcement learning (RL) in large environments often suffers from severe computational bottlenecks, as conventional regret minimization algorithms require repeated, costly calls to planning and statistical estimation oracles. While…
We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPG). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space…
We study robust Markov games (RMG) with $s$-rectangular uncertainty. We show a general equivalence between computing a robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) of a $s$-rectangular RMG and computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of an appropriately…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
While quantum reinforcement learning (RL) has attracted a surge of attention recently, its theoretical understanding is limited. In particular, it remains elusive how to design provably efficient quantum RL algorithms that can address the…