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We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…
We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with memory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum continuous-time…
We study the public goods game in the noisy case by considering the players with inhomogeneous activity teaching on a square lattice. It is shown that the introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of teaching of the players can remarkably…
In this Brief Report we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game in a population of mobile agents embedded in a 2-dimensional space. In this framework, the backbone of interactions between agents changes in time, allowing us…
The tragedy of the commons illustrates a fundamental social dilemma where individual rational actions lead to collectively undesired outcomes, threatening the sustainability of shared resources. Strategies to escape this dilemma, however,…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
Theoretical approaches to binary-state models on complex networks are generally restricted to infinite size systems, where a set of non-linear deterministic equations is assumed to characterize its dynamics and stationary properties. We…
The emergence of cooperation figures among the main goal of game theory in competitive-cooperative environments. Potential games have long been hinted as viable alternatives to study realistic player behavior. Here, we expand the potential…
Game-theoretic concepts have been extensively studied in economics to provide insight into competitive behaviour and strategic decision making. As computing systems increasingly involve concurrently acting autonomous agents, game-theoretic…
Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e. their critical mass, exceeds a threshold value.…
We study a family of mean field games arising in modeling the behavior of strategic economic agents which move across space maximizing their utility from consumption and have the possibility to accumulate resources for production (such as…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been…
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
Complex networks play an important role in human society and in nature. Stochastic multistate processes provide a powerful framework to model a variety of emerging phenomena such as the dynamics of an epidemic or the spreading of…
In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)…
Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced…
Mean field equilibrium (MFE) has emerged as a computationally tractable solution concept for large dynamic games. However, computing MFE remains challenging due to nonlinearities and the absence of contraction properties, limiting its…