Related papers: Representation theorems for actual and alpha power…

In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…

We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…

We consider multi-agent argumentation, where each agent's view of the arguments is encoded as an argumentation framework (AF). Then we study deliberative processes than can occur on this basis. We think of a deliberative process as taking…

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good…

In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…

In many real-world situations, data is distributed across multiple self-interested agents. These agents can collaborate to build a machine learning model based on data from multiple agents, potentially reducing the error each experiences.…

This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions…

Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…

Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…

A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…

Observable social traits determine how we interact in society and remain pervasive even in our globalized world. While a popular hypothesis states that they may help promote cooperation, the alternative explanation that they facilitate…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the…

The traditional mathematical model for an impartial combinatorial game is defined recursively as a set of the options of the game, where the options are games themselves. We propose a model called gamegraph, together with its generalization…

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…

We introduce parallelism into the basic algebra of games to model concurrent game algebraically. Parallelism is treated as a new kind of game operation. The resulted algebra of concurrent games can be used widely to reason the parallel…

Coalescence, as a kind of ubiquitous group behavior in the nature and society, means that agents, companies or other substances keep consensus in states and act as a whole. This paper considers coalescence for n rational agents with…