Related papers: Single-Sample Bilateral Trade with a Broker
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data, motivating the study of economic processes with data…
We study a risk-sharing economy where an arbitrary number of heterogenous agents trades an arbitrary number of risky assets subject to quadratic transaction costs. For linear state dynamics, the forward-backward stochastic differential…
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
This paper introduces a novel robust trading paradigm, called \textit{multi-double linear policies}, situated within a \textit{generalized} lattice market. Distinctively, our framework departs from most existing robust trading strategies,…
We study the problem of selling $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer, whose values for different items are dependent. Under arbitrary dependence, Hart and Nisan show that no simple mechanism can achieve a non-negligible fraction of the…
The lattice gas automaton (LGA) is proposed for a closed economic market of agents with heterogeneous saving interests. There are two procedures in the standard LGA, i.e., "propagation" + "transaction". If the propagation step is removed…
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the…
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no feasible (IR,…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
A dynamic herding model with interactions of trading volumes is introduced. At time $t$, an agent trades with a probability, which depends on the ratio of the total trading volume at time $t-1$ to its own trading volume at its last trade.…
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished in recent years at the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic computer-science approach of worst-case analysis (corresponding…
Using a model of wealth distribution where traders are characterized by quenched random saving propensities and trade among themselves by bipartite transactions, we mimic the enhanced rates of trading of the rich by introducing the…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by [Blackwell, 1951, 1953]. Initially, the data buyer has only…
This paper focuses on stochastic saddle point problems with decision-dependent distributions. These are problems whose objective is the expected value of a stochastic payoff function and whose data distribution drifts in response to…
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue for a monopolist offering multiple items to multiple heterogeneous buyers. We develop a simple mechanism that obtains a constant factor approximation under the assumption that the buyers' values…
A class of simultaneous equation models arise in the many domains where observed binary outcomes are themselves a consequence of the existing choices of of one of the agents in the model. These models are gaining increasing interest in the…
Binary kinetic exchange models, where money is shuffled between two agents at a time, reproduce the Boltzmann Gibbs exponential wealth distribution but cannot address the multi party trades common in real markets. We generalize the exchange…