Related papers: Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stea…

OpenClaw's ClawHub marketplace hosts tens of thousands of community-contributed agent skills (49,592 in our 2026-04-04 snapshot), and recent audits report that 13-26% contain security vulnerabilities. Regex scanners miss obfuscated…

AI agents can extend their capabilities at inference time by loading reusable skills into context, yet equipping an agent with too many skills, particularly irrelevant ones, degrades performance. As community-driven skill repositories grow,…

Clawdbot is a self-hosted, tool-using personal AI agent with a broad action space spanning local execution and web-mediated workflows, which raises heightened safety and security concerns under ambiguity and adversarial steering. We present…

Tool-augmented language agents frequently fail in real-world deployment due to tool malfunctions--timeouts, API exceptions, or inconsistent outputs--triggering cascading reasoning errors and task abandonment. Existing agent training…

Code agents powered by large language models can execute shell commands on behalf of users, introducing severe security vulnerabilities. This paper presents a two-phase security analysis of the OpenClaw platform. As an open-source AI agent…

OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of…

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for complex tasks, yet deployed agents often remain static, failing to adapt as user needs evolve. This creates a tension between the need for continuous service and the necessity of…

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We…

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege…

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this…

Autonomous AI agents built on open-source runtimes such as OpenClaw expose every available tool to every session by default, regardless of the task. A summarization task receives the same shell execution, subagent spawning, and credential…

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute…

We present a Trojan (backdoor or trapdoor) attack that targets deep learning applications in wireless communications. A deep learning classifier is considered to classify wireless signals using raw (I/Q) samples as features and modulation…

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, \textit{a.k.a., agentic skills}, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit…

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MASs) are transforming personal productivity by autonomously executing complex, cross-platform tasks. Frameworks such as OpenClaw demonstrate the potential of locally deployed agents integrated with personal…

Tool-integrated LLMs can retrieve, compute, and take real-world actions via external tools, but reliability remains a key bottleneck. We argue that failures stem from both tool-use accuracy (how well an agent invokes a tool) and intrinsic…

Agent Skills package SKILL.md files, scripts, reference documents, and repository context into reusable capability units, turning pre-load auditing from single-prompt filtering into cross-file security review. Existing guardrails often flag…

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) in K--12 education offers both transformative opportunities and emerging risks. This study explores how students may Trojanize prompts to elicit unsafe or unintended outputs from LLMs,…

Tool-calling agents are increasingly deployed in real-world customer-facing workflows. Yet most studies on tool-calling agents focus on idealized settings with general, fixed, and well-specified tasks. In real-world applications, user…

The agent--tool interaction loop is a critical attack surface for modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks typically function at the user-prompt or retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context layer…