Related papers: Cooperative games with uncertainty: a survey

In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs" as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This…

Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…

Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…

In this paper, we consider a generalization of cooperative games to the case where a coalition can distribute the earned utility not only among its members but also to other players. In particular, we consider an example where coalitions…

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…

Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory requiring a payoff function that is defined for all subsets of players. This subset utility is used to define both altruistic and selfish…

We review and develop a selection of models of systems with competition and cooperation, with origins in economics, where deep insights can be obtained by the mathematical methods of game theory. Some of these models were touched upon in…

In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…

The present study explores a problem that can be resolved by employing the notion of a partially defined cooperative game, yet cannot by using a restricted game. The following situation is considered: First, it is assumed that the worth of…

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…

The evolution of information and communication technologies has yielded the means of sharing measurements and other information in an efficient and flexible way, which has enabled the size and complexity of control applications to increase.…

We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…

Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act…

We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…

As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…