Related papers: Learning Contact Policies for SEIR Epidemics on Ne…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
We consider the spread of infectious diseases through a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model with social structure, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. In our game…
We consider the control of the COVID-19 pandemic through a standard SIR compartmental model. This control is induced by the aggregation of individuals' decisions to limit their social interactions: when the epidemic is ongoing, an…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing…
We introduce a new type of Mean Field Game epidemiological models, in which subpopulations have different behavioral patterns: some are viewed as "highly rational" (choosing Nash-equilibrium long-term strategies) while others follow…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…
The current COVID-19 pandemic has proven that proper control and prevention of infectious disease require creating and enforcing the appropriate public policies. One critical policy imposed by the policymakers is encouraging the population…
Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for…
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…
A probabilistic approach to the epidemic evolution on realistic social-contact networks allows for characteristic differences among subjects, including the individual number and structure of social contacts, and the heterogeneity of the…
We investigate the strategic behavior of a large population of agents who decide whether to adopt a costly partially effective protection or remain unprotected against the susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemic. In contrast with most…
We investigate the evolution of epidemics over dynamical networks when nodes choose to interact with others in a selfish and decentralized manner. Specifically, we analyze the susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic in…
We study a multi-type SIR epidemic process among a heterogeneous population that interacts through a network. When we base social contact on a random graph with given vertex degrees, we give limit theorems on the fraction of infected…
The vaccination against ongoing epidemics is seldom compulsory but remains one of the most classical means to fight epidemic propagation. However recent debates concerning the innocuity of vaccines and their risk with respect to the risk of…
We investigate infection-curing games on a network epidemics model based on the classical Polya urn scheme that accounts for spatial contagion among neighbouring nodes. We first consider the zero-sum game between competing agents using the…
We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is…
We propose a model, which nests a susceptible-infected-recovered-deceased (SIRD) epidemic model into a dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium framework with agents' mobility. The latter affect both their income and their probability of infecting…