Related papers: Supervised tax compliance and evasion from a spati…
In this Brief Report we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game in a population of mobile agents embedded in a 2-dimensional space. In this framework, the backbone of interactions between agents changes in time, allowing us…
Empirical studies have shown that individuals' behaviors are largely influenced by social conformity, including punishment. However, a coevolutionary theoretical framework that takes into account effects of conformity on individuals'…
Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model…
"Personal responsibility", one of the basic principles of modern law, requires one to be responsible for what he did. However, personal responsibility is far from the only norm ruling human interactions, especially in social and economic…
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…
Modern economies evolved from simpler human exchanges into very convoluted systems. Today, a multitude of aspects can be regulated, tampered with, or left to chance; these are economic {\em degrees of freedom} which together shape the flow…
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike…
Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior.…
There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
Successful collective action on issues from climate change to the maintenance of democracy depends on societal properties such as cultural tightness and social cohesion. How these properties evolve is not well understood because they emerge…
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction…
We propose an evolutionary model to study the transition toward green technology under the influence of innovation. Clean and dirty technologies are selected according to their profitability under an environmental tax, which depends on the…
The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable…
In this work we study a model of tax evasion. We considered a fixed population divided in three compartments, namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and a third class between the mentioned two, which we call \textit{susceptibles} to become…
This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R\&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal…
A microscopic dynamic model is here constructed and analyzed, describing the evolution of the income distribution in the presence of taxation and redistribution in a society in which also tax evasion and auditing processes occur. The focus…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…
Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…
Commonly, the strategy revision phase in evolutionary games relies on payoff comparison. Namely, agents compare their payoff with the opponent, assessing whether changing strategy can be potentially convenient. Even tiny payoff differences…