Related papers: Solving Imperfect-Recall Games via Sum-of-Squares …
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
We study multi-player turn-based games played on (potentially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We…
The behaviour of the moment-sums-of-squares (moment-SOS) hierarchy for polynomial optimal control problems on compact sets has been explored to a large extent. Our contribution focuses on the case of non-compact control sets. We describe a…
We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a \emph{computational game}, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some…
In this work, we propose, for the first time, a reinforcement learning framework specifically designed for zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games. This approach offers a generalized solution for scenarios in which accurate…
We study two-player (zero-sum) concurrent mean-payoff games played on a finite-state graph. We focus on the important sub-class of ergodic games where all states are visited infinitely often with probability 1. The algorithmic study of…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
Sum-of-squares (SOS) optimization provides a computationally tractable framework for certifying polynomial nonnegativity. If the considered problem is convex, the SOS problem can be transcribed into and solved by semi-definite programs.…
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…
Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free…
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
In games with imperfect recall, players may forget the sequence of decisions they made in the past. When players also forget whether they have already encountered their current decision point, they are said to be absent-minded. Solving…
The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…
We consider the problem of learning sparse polymatrix games from observations of strategic interactions. We show that a polynomial time method based on $\ell_{1,2}$-group regularized logistic regression recovers a game, whose Nash…
We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…
We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…
A classic result in the theory of extensive-form games asserts that the set of strategies available to any perfect-recall player is strategically equivalent to a low-dimensional convex polytope, called the sequence-form polytope. Online…
The Gromov-Wasserstein (GW) problem is an extension of the classical optimal transport problem to settings where the source and target distributions reside in incomparable spaces, and for which a cost function that attributes the price of…
Equilibrium learning in adversarial games is an important topic widely examined in the fields of game theory and reinforcement learning (RL). Pursuit-evasion game (PEG), as an important class of real-world games from the fields of robotics…