Related papers: Matching with Committee Preferences
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one…
Suppose a committee consisting of three members has to match $n$ candidates to $n$ different positions. Each member of the committee proposes a matching, however the proposed matchings totally disagree, i.e., every candidate is matched to…
We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
This paper introduces a novel revealed-preference approach to ranking colleges and professional schools based on applicants' choices and standardized test scores. Unlike traditional rankings that rely on data supplied by institutions or…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
Ranking and comparing items is crucial for collecting information about preferences in many areas, from marketing to politics. The Mallows rank model is among the most successful approaches to analyse rank data, but its computational…
We present a preference learning framework for multiple criteria sorting. We consider sorting procedures applying an additive value model with diverse types of marginal value functions (including linear, piecewise-linear, splined, and…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
In many applications, human and LLM evaluators use assessments of relevant criteria to create an overall evaluation for an item or individual. For example, in admissions, committees assess candidates on attributes such as test scores, GPA,…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…