Related papers: Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences

Fairness in multiwinner elections is studied in varying contexts. For instance, diversity of candidates and representation of voters are both separately termed as being fair. A common denominator to ensure fairness across all such contexts…

Considering voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference rankings modifies the paradigm of probabilistic studies of voting procedures. This article proposes several simulation models for generating evaluation-based voting…

Consider Plurality with random tie-breaking. This paper uses standard axiomatic extensions of preferences over elements to preferences over sets (Kelly, Gardenfors, Responsiveness) to characterize all better-replies of a voter under…

Elections involving a very large voter population often lead to outcomes that surprise many. This is particularly important for the elections in which results affect the economy of a sizable population. A better prediction of the true…

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…

We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…

A core tension in the study of plurality elections is the clash between the classic Hotelling-Downs model, which predicts that two office-seeking candidates should position themselves at the median voter's policy, and the empirical…

Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them.…

A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is; second, it must satisfy reasonable postulates. This paper…

We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…

Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider…

We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…

For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negligible in a large election. Consequently, there is a large body of literature on characterizing the likelihood for an election to be…

A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to…

This work presents short-time Monte Carlo simulations for the two dimensional Majority-vote model starting from ordered and disordered states. It has been found that there are two pseudo-critical points, each one within the error-bar range…

The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…

In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…

We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to…