Related papers: Computing Equilibria in Games with Stochastic Acti…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We study what dataset assumption permits solving offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. In stark contrast to the offline single-agent Markov decision process, we show that the single strategy concentration assumption is insufficient for…
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…
We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…
We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
The distributed computation of equilibria and optima has seen growing interest in a broad collection of networked problems. We consider the computation of equilibria of convex stochastic Nash games characterized by a possibly nonconvex…
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which…
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…
Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…
Game theory is playing more and more important roles in understanding complex systems and in investigating intelligent machines with various uncertainties. As a starting point, we consider the classical two-player zero-sum linear-quadratic…
We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in Markov games which is a cornerstone in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In particular, we focus on infinite-horizon adversarial team Markov games (ATMGs) in which agents…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
We present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing equilibria in congestion games, under smoothed running-time analysis. More precisely, we prove that if the resource costs of a congestion game are randomly…