Related papers: MEV in Binance Builder
We study a new "laminated" queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. The model aims to capture and generalise transaction queueing infrastructure that has arisen to organise MEV activity on public…
We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV concerns. Previous analyses have insufficiently or incorrectly modeled the…
Blockchains offer strong security gurarantees, but cannot protect users against the ordering of transactions. Players such as miners, bots and validators can reorder various transactions and reap significant profits, called the Maximal…
Blockchain's economic value lies in enabling financial and economic transactions without relying on trusted, centralized intermediaries. In practice, however, transactions pass through a fragmented chain of intermediaries before being…
Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…
In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible…
Ethereum has emerged as a leading platform for decentralized applications (dApps) due to its robust smart contract capabilities. One of the critical issues in the Ethereum ecosystem is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), a concept that has…
This paper studies a fundamental problem regarding the security of blockchain PoW consensus on how the existence of multiple misbehaving miners influences the profitability of selfish mining. Each selfish miner (or attacker interchangeably)…
We mine the leaked history of trades on Mt. Gox, the dominant Bitcoin exchange from 2011 to early 2014, to detect the triangular arbitrage activity conducted within the platform. The availability of user identifiers per trade allows us to…
We introduce a modified Schnorr signature scheme to allow for time-bound signatures for transaction fee auction bidding and smart contract purposes in a blockchain context, ensuring an honest producer can only validate a signature before a…
Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice, mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the Bitcoin community. We provide an explanation using a simple model to…
This study explores the intricacies of waiting games, a novel dynamic that emerged with Ethereum's transition to a Proof-of-Stake (PoS)-based block proposer selection protocol. Within this PoS framework, validators acquire a distinct…
This paper examines how various categories of Ethereum stakers respond to changes in the consensus issuance schedule, and the potential impact of such changes on the composition of the staking market. To this end, we have develop and…
Blockchains revolutionized centralized sectors like banking and finance by promoting decentralization and transparency. In a blockchain, information is transmitted through transactions issued by participants or applications. Miners…
Autonomous Market Makers (AMMs) rely on arbitrage to facilitate passive price updates. Liquidity fragmentation poses a complex challenge across different blockchain networks. This paper proposes FluxLayer, a solution to mitigate fragmented…
Users of decentralized finance (DeFi) applications face significant risks from adversarial actions that manipulate the order of transactions to extract value from users. Such actions -- an adversarial form of what is called…
In this paper, we investigate two methods that allow us to automatically create profitable DeFi trades, one well-suited to arbitrage and the other applicable to more complicated settings. We first adopt the Bellman-Ford-Moore algorithm with…
Many blockchain platform are subject to maximal value extraction (MEV), and users on the platform are losing money while sending transactions because the transaction order can be manipulated to extract value from them. Consensus protocols…
We study a novel automated market maker design: the function maximizing AMM (FM-AMM). Our central assumption is that trades are batched before execution. Because of competition between arbitrageurs, the FM-AMM eliminates arbitrage profits…