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Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-01-21 Yitian Wang , Yebo Feng , Yingjiu Li , Jiahua Xu

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-06-13 Johannes Rude Jensen , Victor von Wachter , Omri Ross

With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…

Networking and Internet Architecture · Computer Science 2023-06-06 Anton Wahrstätter , Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Davor Svetinovic , Arthur Gervais

The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science · Computer Science 2024-07-22 Burak Öz , Danning Sui , Thomas Thiery , Florian Matthes

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-05-01 Sen Yang , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-08-22 Jonah Burian , Davide Crapis , Fahad Saleh

Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2023-11-16 Mallesh Pai , Max Resnick

Ethereum, as a representative of Web3, adopts a novel framework called Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) to prevent the centralization of block profits in the hands of institutional Ethereum stakers. Introducing builders to generate blocks…

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science · Computer Science 2024-11-14 Shuzheng Wang , Yue Huang , Wenqin Zhang , Yuming Huang , Xuechao Wang , Jing Tang

In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV which desires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal research supporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains, DeFi and…

Computers and Society · Computer Science 2023-05-08 Simona Ramos , Joshua Ellul

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-05-07 Ao Zhang , Yunwen Liu , Ren Zhang , Yingdi Shan , Yongwei Wu

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-03-19 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Akaki Mamageishvili , Christoph Schlegel , Benny Sudakov , Danning Sui

This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-01-23 Pascal Stichler

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can reap significant profits by selectively including, excluding, or…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-10-24 Sen Yang , Fan Zhang , Ken Huang , Xi Chen , Youwei Yang , Feng Zhu

A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-20 Bence Ladóczk , Miklós Rásonyi , János Tapolcai

Permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin have excelled at financial services. Yet, opportunistic traders extract monetary value from the mesh of decentralized finance (DeFi) smart contracts through so-called blockchain extractable value…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2021-12-13 Kaihua Qin , Liyi Zhou , Arthur Gervais
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