Related papers: Equilibria in Large Position-Optimization Games
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
The use of game theoretic models has been quite successful in describing various cooperative and non-cooperative optimization problems in networks and other domains of computer systems. In this paper, we study an application of game…
We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these…
We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…
The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, representing their ideological position on an issue. Each…
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
Motivated by empirical evidence that individuals within group decision making simultaneously aspire to maximize utility and avoid inequality we propose a criterion based on the entropy-norm pair for geometric selection of strict Nash…
The classical Hotelling game is played on a line segment whose points represent uniformly distributed clients. The $n$ players of the game are servers who need to place themselves on the line segment, and once this is done, each client gets…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
In this work, we present a novel characterization of approximate Nash equilibria in a class of convex games over the simplex. To achieve this, we regularize the utility functions using the Shannon entropy term, connect the solutions to the…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…