Related papers: Network Interventions: Targeting Agents or Targeti…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
Agents are systems that optimize an objective function in an environment. Together, the goal and the environment induce secondary objectives, incentives. Modeling the agent-environment interaction using causal influence diagrams, we can…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
Targeted interventions in games present a challenging problem due to the asymmetric information available to the regulator and the agents. This note addresses the problem of steering the actions of self-interested agents in quadratic…
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity…
Many socioeconomic phenomena, such as technology adoption, collaborative problem-solving, and content engagement, involve a collection of agents coordinating to take a common action, aligning their decisions to maximize their individual…
We analyze the phenomenon of collusion for the purpose of boosting the pagerank of a node in an interlinked environment. We investigate the optimal attack pattern for a group of nodes (attackers) attempting to improve the ranking of a…
Communication networks are essential for our economy and our everyday lives. This makes them lucrative targets for attacks. Today, we see an ongoing battle between criminals that try to disrupt our key communication networks and security…
In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (or zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence…
People choose friendships with people similar to themselves, i.e. they sort by resemblence. Economic studies have shown when sorting is optimal and constitute an equilibrium, however, this presumes lack of beneficial spillovers. We…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
This article considers the minimization of the total number of infected individuals over the course of an epidemic in which the rate of infectious contacts can be reduced by time-dependent nonpharmaceutical interventions. The societal and…
Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks, ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although the purpose of an attack is to damage a target…
We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to…
This paper considers a network formation model when links are potentially misclassified. We focus on a game-theoretical model of strategic network formation with incomplete information, in which the linking decisions depend on agents'…
We study the problem of designing dynamic intervention policies for minimizing networked defaults in financial networks. Formally, we consider a dynamic version of the celebrated Eisenberg-Noe model of financial network liabilities and use…
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a…
In this work, we consider two types of adversarial attacks on a network of nodes seeking to reach consensus. The first type involves an adversary that is capable of breaking a specific number of links at each time instant. In the second…
We consider the problem of a dynamical network whose dynamics is subject to external perturbations (`attacks') locally applied at a subset of the network nodes. We assume that the network has an ability to defend itself against attacks with…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…