Related papers: Provably Convergent Actor-Critic in Risk-averse MA…
Risk-aversion and bounded rationality are two key characteristics of human decision-making. Risk-averse quantal-response equilibrium (RQE) is a solution concept that incorporates these features, providing a more realistic depiction of human…
A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. To overcome this obstacle, we take inspiration from…
In this paper, we study large population multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of discrete-time linear-quadratic mean-field games (LQ-MFGs). Our setting differs from most existing work on RL for MFGs, in that we consider a…
Provably efficient and robust equilibrium computation in general-sum Markov games remains a core challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nash equilibrium is computationally intractable in general and brittle due to equilibrium…
Recent advances in mean-field game literature enable the reduction of large-scale multi-agent problems to tractable interactions between a representative agent and a population distribution. However, existing approaches typically assume a…
In real-world multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) applications, agents may not have perfect state information (e.g., due to inaccurate measurement or malicious attacks), which challenges the robustness of agents' policies. Though…
We introduce a new solution concept for bounded rational agents in finite normal-form general-sum games called Generalized Quantal Response Equilibrium (GQRE) which generalizes Quantal Response Equilibrium~\citep{mckelvey1995quantal}. In…
Coordination is one of the essential problems in multi-agent systems. Typically multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods treat agents equally and the goal is to solve the Markov game to an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (NE) when…
We show that computing approximate stationary Markov coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in general-sum stochastic games is computationally intractable, even when there are two players, the game is turn-based, the discount factor is an…
In this paper, we investigate the infinite-horizon risk-constrained linear quadratic regulator problem (RC-QR), which augments the classical LQR formulation with a statistical constraint on the variability of the system state to incorporate…
We consider a multi-agent Markov strategic interaction over an infinite horizon where agents can be of multiple types. We model the strategic interaction as a mean-field game in the asymptotic limit when the number of agents of each type…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…
Many emerging agentic paradigms require agents to collaborate with one another (or people) to achieve shared goals. Unfortunately, existing approaches to learning policies for such collaborative problems produce brittle solutions that fail…
In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from…
Though limited in real-world decision making, most multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) models assume perfectly rational agents -- a property hardly met due to individual's cognitive limitation and/or the tractability of the decision…
We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…
Non-stationarity is a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where agents update their behaviour as they learn. Many theoretical advances in MARL avoid the challenge of non-stationarity by coordinating the…
While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental…
Mean field games (MFGs) tractably model behavior in large agent populations. The literature on learning MFG equilibria typically focuses on finding Nash equilibria (NE), which assume perfectly rational agents and are hence implausible in…
Identification and analysis of symmetrical patterns in the natural world have led to significant discoveries across various scientific fields, such as the formulation of gravitational laws in physics and advancements in the study of…