Related papers: Truthful Fair Division under Stochastic Valuations
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money, which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC). An instance of TIC consists of a set of agents each associated with an individual interval on a line, and the…
Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents' reports with those of their peers. In the detail-free multi-task setting, agents respond to multiple…
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an \alpha-approximation algorithm translates into an…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a…
Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…