Related papers: Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
This study constructs a novel analytical general equilibrium model to compare environmental policies in a setting where oligopolistic energy firms engage in third-degree price discrimination across residential consumers and industrial…
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such…
Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically…
To determine the welfare implications of price changes in demand data, we introduce a revealed preference relation over prices. We show that the absence of cycles in this relation characterizes a consumer who trades off the utility of…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they…
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear…
We interpret multi-product supply chains (SCs) as coordinated markets; under this interpretation, a SC optimization problem is a market clearing problem that allocates resources and associated economic values (prices) to different…
Stochastic matching is the stochastic version of the well-known matching problem, which consists in maximizing the rewards of a matching under a set of probability distributions associated with the nodes and edges. In most stochastic…
I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply…
We study learning dynamics in distributed production economies such as blockchain mining, peer-to-peer file sharing and crowdsourcing. These economies can be modelled as multi-product Cournot competitions or all-pay auctions (Tullock…
Geopolitical conflicts have increasingly been a driver of trade policy. We study the potential effects of global and persistent geopolitical conflicts on trade, technological innovation, and economic growth. In conventional trade models the…
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as…
This paper considers the problem of offering a scarce object with a common unobserved quality to strategic agents in a priority queue. Each agent has a private signal over the quality of the object and observes the decisions made by other…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We consider an environment where sellers compete over buyers. All sellers are a-priori identical and strategically signal buyers about the product they sell. In a setting motivated by on-line advertising in display ad exchanges, where firms…