Related papers: Computing stable limit cycles of learning in games
Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work on this front, it was conjectured that the attractors of the replicator…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
One could observe drastically different dynamics of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games under replicator equations. In zero-sum games, heteroclinic cycles naturally occur whenever the species of the population supersede each other in a cyclic…
Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…
TASP (Time Average Shapley Polygon, Bena{\=\i}m, Hofbauer and Hopkins, \emph{Journal of Economic Theory}, 2009), as a novel evolutionary dynamics model, predicts that a game could converge to cycles instead of fix points (Nash equilibria).…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
Game theory has been widely applied to many areas including economics, biology and social sciences. However, it is still challenging to quantify the global stability and global dynamics of the game theory. We developed a landscape and flux…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
We study a system of ordinary differential equations in R5 that is used as a model both in population dynamics and in game theory, and is known to exhibit a heteroclinic network consisting in the union of four types of elementary…
A class of graphs $\mathscr{C}$ is monadically stable if for any unary expansion $\widehat{\mathscr{C}}$ of $\mathscr{C}$, one cannot interpret, in first-order logic, arbitrarily long linear orders in graphs from $\widehat{\mathscr{C}}$. It…
We show that evolutionarily stable states in general (nonlinear) population games (which can be viewed as continuous vector fields constrained on a polytope) are asymptotically stable under a multiplicative weights dynamic (under…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…
We consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential games that converts to a Langevin equation on a sphere after a change of variables. This is distinct from the models studied earlier. In particular, it is ill-posed…