Related papers: Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlati…
Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…
A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. The ideal auction architecture for differentiable economics…
In this paper, we propose the inexact alternating minimization algorithm (inexact AMA), which allows inexact iterations in the algorithm, and its accelerated variant, called the inexact fast alternating minimization algorithm (inexact…
Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning. Existing works on multi item auction scenarios can be roughly divided into RegretNet-like and affine maximizer auctions (AMAs) approaches.…
Auto-bidding has recently become a popular feature in ad auctions. This feature enables advertisers to simply provide high-level constraints and goals to an automated agent, which optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. In this paper,…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
When aligning large language models (LLMs), their performance on various tasks (such as being helpful, harmless, and honest) depends heavily on the composition of their training data. However, selecting a data mixture that achieves strong…
We study the problem of selling $n$ items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally,…
Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…
We present a new class of statistical error reduction techniques for Monte-Carlo simulations. Using covariant symmetries, we show that correlation functions can be constructed from inexpensive approximations without introducing any…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
We present a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (MLCA). The main goal of integrating machine learning (ML) into the auction is to improve preference elicitation, which is a major challenge in large combinatorial…
Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines or other autonomous entities in distributed systems. When different bidders have different demands and valuations on different types of resources or tasks, the…
As machine learning algorithms grow in popularity and diversify to many industries, ethical and legal concerns regarding their fairness have become increasingly relevant. We explore the problem of algorithmic fairness, taking an…
The Alternating Minimization Algorithm (AMA) has been proposed by Tseng to solve convex programming problems with two-block separable linear constraints and objectives, whereby (at least) one of the components of the latter is assumed to be…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution of bidders'…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control…
In this paper we consider the problem of decentralized (distributed) adaptive learning, where the aim of the network is to train the coefficients of a widely linear autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model by measurements collected by the…