Related papers: Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations
We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as "truth" or "falsehood". Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by…
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown underlying binary state of the world. Each agent, prior to making a decision, receives an independent private signal whose distribution depends…
We study a neuro-inspired model that mimics a discussion (or information dissemination) process in a network of agents. During their interaction, agents redistribute activity and network weights, resulting in emergence of leader(s). The…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
Humans and other animals often follow the decisions made by others because these are indicative of the quality of possible choices, resulting in `social response rules': observed relationships between the probability that an agent will make…
When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…
Modern supply networks are complex interconnected systems. Multi-agent models are increasingly explored to optimise their performance. Most research assumes agents will have full observability of the system by having a single policy…
In recent studies of political decision-making, apparently anomalous behavior has been observed on the part of voters, in which negative information about a candidate strengthens, rather than weakens, a prior positive opinion about the…
We consider model social networks in which information propagates directionally across layers of rational agents. Each agent makes a locally optimal estimate of the state of the world, and communicates this estimate to agents downstream.…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any…
The iterative consensus problem requires a set of processes or agents with different initial values, to interact and update their states to eventually converge to a common value. Protocols solving iterative consensus serve as building…
An information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios is studied where the private data is either hidden or observable. In each scenario, privacy leakage constraints are considered using two different measures. In…
In this paper, a novel Generation-Evaluation framework is developed for multi-turn conversations with the objective of letting both participants know more about each other. For the sake of rational knowledge utilization and coherent…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a…
Language model (LM) agents that act on users' behalf for personal tasks (e.g., replying emails) can boost productivity, but are also susceptible to unintended privacy leakage risks. We present the first study on people's capacity to oversee…