Related papers: Improved Parallel Repetition for GHZ-Supported Gam…

In a recent work, Moshkovitz [FOCS '14] presented a transformation on two-player games called "fortification", and gave an elementary proof of an (exponential decay) parallel repetition theorem for fortified two-player projection games. In…

We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…

We obtain quantitative estimates on the decay of the multiplayer optimal value under parallel repetition. In comparison to a previous work of the author in 2025 (arXiv: 2508.09380) which sought to generalize dependency-breaking and…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite state space for an infinite number of rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players (player 1 and player 2) choose their moves independently and simultaneously;…

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

We consider aggregative games with affine coupling constraints, where agents have partial information on the aggregate value and can only communicate with neighbouring agents. We propose a single-layer distributed algorithm that reaches a…

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic…

We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…

In this article, we establish precise convergence rates of a general class of $N$-Player Stackelberg games to their mean field limits, which allows the response time delay of information, empirical distribution based interactions, and the…

This work studies Nash equilibrium seeking for a class of stochastic aggregative games, where each player has an expectation-valued objective function depending on its local strategy and the aggregate of all players' strategies. We propose…

Proof-Number Search is a best-first search algorithm with many successful applications, especially in game solving. As large-scale computing clusters become increasingly accessible, parallelization is a natural way to accelerate…

We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We prove that there exists a constant $\epsilon>0$ such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (nXn) game requires quasi-polynomial time,…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…

Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…