Related papers: Chaos in Autobidding Auctions
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
Budget pacing is a popular service that has been offered by major internet advertising platforms since their inception. Budget pacing systems seek to optimize advertiser returns subject to budget constraints by smoothly spending advertiser…
The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of $k$ bidders where: a) bidders have a per-round individual rationality constraint, b) bidders may leave the mechanism at any point, and c) the bidders' valuations are…
Simple Clock Auctions (SCA) are a mechanism commonly used in spectrum auctions to sell lots of frequency bandwidths. We study such an auction with one player having access to perfect information against straightforward bidders. When the…
Exploiting a precise reproduction of a stock exchange, the robustness of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism, evaluated by means of the waiting time distributions, has been proved versus 36 different set ups made by varying both…
Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…
Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches…
In online advertising, a set of potential advertisements can be ranked by a certain auction system where usually the top-1 advertisement would be selected and displayed at an advertising space. In this paper, we show a selection bias issue…
Managing millions of digital auctions is an essential task for modern advertising auction systems. The main approach to managing digital auctions is an autobidding approach, which depends on the Click-Through Rate and Conversion Rate…
Visualization dashboards are increasingly used in strategic settings like auctions to enhance decision-making and reduce strategic confusion. This paper presents behavioral experiments evaluating how different dashboard designs affect bid…
Auto-bidding plays an important role in online advertising and has become a crucial tool for advertisers and advertising platforms to meet their performance objectives and optimize the efficiency of ad delivery. Advertisers employing…
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining…
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
A large fraction of online advertisement is sold via repeated second price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: Can…
Advertisers increasingly use automated bidding to optimize their ad campaigns on online advertising platforms. Autobidding optimizes an advertiser's objective subject to various constraints, e.g. average ROI and budget constraints. In this…