Related papers: Continuation-Performance Decomposition in Dynamic …

This paper provides a decomposition technique for the purpose of simplifying the solution of certain zero-sum differential games. The games considered terminate when the state reaches a target, which can be expressed as the union of a…

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

Pursuit-Evasion Games (in discrete time) are stochastic games with nonnegative daily payoffs, with the final payoff being the cumulative sum of payoffs during the game. We show that such games admit a value even in the presence of…

We study continuity properties of stochastic game problems with respect to various topologies on information structures, defined as probability measures characterizing a game. We will establish continuity properties of the value function…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…

We study dynamic games with hidden states and absorbing failure, where belief-driven actions can trigger irreversible collapse. In such environments, equilibria that sustain activity generically operate at the boundary of viability. We show…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

While recent continual learning methods largely alleviate the catastrophic problem on toy-sized datasets, some issues remain to be tackled to apply them to real-world problem domains. First, a continual learning model should effectively…

We study variants of regular infinite games where the strict alternation of moves between the two players is subject to modifications. The second player may postpone a move for a finite number of steps, or, in other words, exploit in his…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

A computation in the continuation monad returns a final result given a continuation, ie. it is a function with type $(X \to R) \to R$. If we instead return the intermediate result at $X$ then our computation is called a selection function.…

Combining local exceptions and first class continuations leads to programs with complex control flow, as well as the possibility of expressing powerful constructs such as resumable exceptions. We describe and compare games models for a…

Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship…

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…

Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…

In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…

We study a class of zero-sum stochastic games between a stopper and a singular-controller, previously considered in [Bovo and De Angelis (2025)]. The underlying singularly-controlled dynamics takes values in…

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…

We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player's priority…