Related papers: Punishment in bipartite societies
The positive impact of cooperative bots on cooperation within evolutionary game theory is well documented; however, existing studies have predominantly used discrete strategic frameworks, focusing on deterministic actions with a fixed…
Empirical studies have shown that individuals' behaviors are largely influenced by social conformity, including punishment. However, a coevolutionary theoretical framework that takes into account effects of conformity on individuals'…
Public goods game serves as a valuable paradigm for studying the challenges of collective cooperation in human and natural societies. Peer punishment is often considered as an effective incentive for promoting cooperation in such contexts.…
Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote the evolution of cooperation. In real society, the way in which social exclusion works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work…
In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However,…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy.…
Uniform punishment policies can sustain cooperation in social dilemmas but impose severe costs on enforcers, creating a second-order free-rider problem that undermines the very mechanism designed to prevent exploitation. We show that the…
Kin selection and direct reciprocity are two most basic mechanisms for promoting cooperation in human society. Generalizing the standard models of the multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods games for heterogeneous populations,…
Two mechanisms that have been used to study the evolution of cooperative behavior are altruistic punishment, in which cooperative individuals pay additional costs to punish defection, and multilevel selection, in which competition between…
Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
It has been an old unsolved puzzle to evolutionary theorists on which mechanisms would increase large-scale cooperation in human societies. Thus, how such mechanisms operate in a biological network is still not very understood. This study…
The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties…