Related papers: The Impossibility of Strategyproof Rank Aggregatio…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
In rank aggregation, the task is to aggregate multiple weighted input rankings into a single output ranking. While numerous methods, so-called social welfare functions (SWFs), have been suggested for this problem, all of the classical SWFs…
Statistical parity metrics have been widely studied and endorsed in the AI community as a means of achieving fairness, but they suffer from at least two weaknesses. They disregard the actual welfare consequences of decisions and may…
In many real-world settings, a centralized decision-maker must repeatedly allocate finite resources to a population over multiple time steps. Individuals who receive a resource derive some stochastic utility; to characterize the…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
In the problem of aggregating experts' probabilistic predictions over an ordered set of outcomes, we introduce the axiom of level-strategy\-proofness (level-SP) and prove that it is a natural notion with several applications. Moreover, it…
Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of…
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
This paper addresses the problem of rank aggregation, which aims to find a consensus ranking among multiple ranking inputs. Traditional rank aggregation methods are deterministic, and can be categorized into explicit and implicit methods…
Rank aggregation is an essential approach for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which maximises the number of pairwise agreements between the final ranking and the existing…
In social choice theory, (Kemeny) rank aggregation is a well-studied problem where the goal is to combine rankings from multiple voters into a single ranking on the same set of items. Since rankings can reveal preferences of voters (which a…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly entrusted with high-stakes decisions that affect human welfare. However, the principles and values that guide these models when distributing scarce societal resources remain largely unexamined.…
Many multi-agent socio-technical systems rely on aggregating heterogeneous agents' costs into a social cost function (SCF) to coordinate resource allocation in domains like energy grids, water allocation, or traffic management. The choice…
Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to…
In search and advertisement ranking, it is often required to simultaneously maximize multiple objectives. For example, the objectives can correspond to multiple intents of a search query, or in the context of advertising, they can be…
Ensuring fairness in algorithmic ranking systems is a critical challenge with significant societal implications for hiring, recommendations, web search, and data management. Standard methods for aggregating multiple preference orders into a…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…