Related papers: Stable Matching with Predictions: Robustness and E…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…