Related papers: Efficiently Solving Mixed-Hierarchy Games with Qua…

Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…

Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…

As assembly tasks grow in complexity, collaboration among multiple robots becomes essential for task completion. However, centralized task planning has become inadequate for adapting to the increasing intelligence and versatility of robots,…

In strategic scenarios where decision-makers operate at different hierarchical levels, traditional optimization methods are often inadequate for handling uncertainties from incomplete information or unpredictable external factors. To fill…

We design a computational approach to find equilibria in a class of Nash games possessing a hierarchical structure. By using tools from mixed-integer optimization and the characterization of variational equilibria in terms of the…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

As intelligent robots like autonomous vehicles become increasingly deployed in the presence of people, the extent to which these systems should leverage model-based game-theoretic planners versus data-driven policies for safe,…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have attracted a great deal of attention recently as their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems has become evident. In this paper, we study min-max games with…

The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

Stackelberg games have been widely used to model interactive decision-making problems in a variety of domains such as energy systems, transportation, cybersecurity, and human-robot interaction. However, existing algorithms for solving…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…