Related papers: Leader-Follower Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Grapho…
In this paper, a decentralized stochastic control system consisting of one leader and many homogeneous followers is studied. The leader and followers are coupled in both dynamics and cost, where the dynamics are linear and the cost function…
This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a finite number of leaders, a finite number of major followers and an infinite number of minor followers. The leaders and the followers each observe types privately…
We consider a class of nonsmooth aggregative games over networks in stochastic regimes, where each player is characterized by a composite cost function $f_i+r_i$, $f_i$ is a smooth expectation-valued function dependent on its own strategy…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…
We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…
We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
Game-theoretic models of learning are a powerful set of models that optimize multi-objective architectures. Among these models are zero-sum architectures that have inspired adversarial learning frameworks. An important shortcoming of these…
In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…
This paper investigates open-loop and feedback solutions of linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and a large number of followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the…
We consider a bilevel optimization problem having a single leader and multiple followers. The followers choose their strategies simultaneously, and are assumed to converge to a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We begin by providing a…
There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…