Related papers: Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfer…
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…
Dynamic max-min fair allocation (DMMF) is a simple and popular mechanism for the repeated allocation of a shared resource among competing agents: in each round, each agent can choose to request or not for the resource, which is then…
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains from which agents' values come from -- can capture arbitrarily…
We study \emph{rental games} -- a single-parameter dynamic mechanism design problem, in which a designer rents out an indivisible asset over $n$ days. Each day, an agent arrives with a private valuation per day of rental, drawn from that…
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
This paper proposes a method to design an optimal dynamic contract between a principal and an agent, who has the authority to control both the principal's revenue and an engineered system. The key characteristic of our problem setting is…
We consider an M/M/1 queueing model where customers can strategically decide to enter or leave the queue. We characterize the class of queueing regimes such that, for any parameters of the model, the socially efficient behavior is an…
This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…
In traditional priority queues, we assume that every customer upon arrival has a fixed, class-dependent priority, and that a customer may not commence service if a customer with a higher priority is present in the queue. However, in…
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
Retailers use a variety of mechanisms to enable sales and delivery. A relatively new offering by companies is curbside pickup where customers purchase goods online, schedule a pickup time, and come to a pickup facility to receive their…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…