Related papers: Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resourc…
Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has been extensively studied, particularly in reward distribution among agents in scenarios such as goods allocation, resource division, lotteries, and bargaining systems. Fairness in MAS depends on…
We consider the following shared-resource scheduling problem: Given a set of jobs $J$, for each $j\in J$ we must schedule a job-specific processing volume of $v_j>0$. A total resource of $1$ is available at any time. Jobs have a resource…
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the…
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
In many competitive settings, from education to politics, rules do not reward effort evenly, and thresholds (e.g., grade cutoffs or electoral majorities) make some moments disproportionately important. Success thus depends on efficiently…
Empirical data shows that in the absence of incentives, a peer participating in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network wishes to free-riding. Most solutions for providing incentives in P2P networks are based on direct reciprocity, which are not…
In credit markets, screening algorithms aim to discriminate between good-type and bad-type borrowers. However, when doing so, they can also discriminate between individuals sharing a protected attribute (e.g. gender, age, racial origin) and…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
Recently, almost all conferences have moved to virtual mode due to the pandemic-induced restrictions on travel and social gathering. Contrary to in-person conferences, virtual conferences face the challenge of efficiently scheduling talks,…
In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a…
We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…
We study the fairness of dynamic resource allocation problem under the $\alpha$-fairness criterion. We recognize two different fairness objectives that naturally arise in this problem: the well-understood slot-fairness objective that aims…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…
Interconnection networks of parallel systems are used for servicing traf- fic generated by different applications, often belonging to different users. When multiple traffic flows contend for channel bandwidth, the scheduling algorithm…
We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…
In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incentive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. Given samples from the agents' type…
Credit scoring has been catalogued by the European Commission and the Executive Office of the US President as a high-risk classification task, a key concern being the potential harms of making loan approval decisions based on models that…
Autonomous agents that act with each other on behalf of humans are becoming more common in many social domains, such as customer service, transportation, and health care. In such social situations greedy strategies can reduce the positive…