Related papers: Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candi…
We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering the projects' costs, obtaining additional approvals for…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…
We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider…
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
Election control considers the problem of an adversary who attempts to tamper with a voting process, in order to either ensure that their favored candidate wins (constructive control) or another candidate loses (destructive control). As…
Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…
The aim of this paper is to introduce models and algorithms for the Participatory Budgeting problem when projects can interact with each other. In this problem, the objective is to select a set of projects that fits in a given budget.…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…
Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important…
Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive)…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of community members. PB outcomes are commonly evaluated for how they reflect voters preferences (e.g., social welfare) and the extent…
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity…
News outlets, surveyors, and other organizations often conduct polls on social networks to gain insights into public opinion. Such a poll is typically started by someone on a social network who sends it to her friends. If a person…
Strategic manipulation of elections is typically studied in the context of promoting individual candidates. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters may care more about the overall governing coalition than the…
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is commonly studied from an axiomatic perspective, where the aim is to design procedurally fair and economically efficient rules for voters with full information regarding their preferences. In contrast, we take…