Related papers: A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We consider the model introduced by Bilu and Linial (2010), who study problems for which the optimal clustering does not change when distances are perturbed. They show that even when a problem is NP-hard, it is sometimes possible to obtain…
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
We consider the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in hospital preferences. Among the three notions of stability, namely weak stability, strong stability, and super-stability, we focus on the notion of strong…
Assigning tasks to service providers is a frequent procedure across various applications. Often the tasks arrive dynamically while the service providers remain static. Preventing task rejection caused by service provider overload is of…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
Preserving stability is a central problem in data-driven model order reduction of dynamical systems. For linear systems whose dynamics depend on geometric or physical parameters, multivariate rational approximation algorithms such as the…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We study the problem of optimizing a graph-structured objective function under \emph{adversarial} uncertainty. This problem can be modeled as a two-persons zero-sum game between an Engineer and Nature. The Engineer controls a subset of the…
Unlike commercial ridesharing, non-commercial peer-to-peer (P2P) ridesharing has been subject to limited research -- although it can promote viable solutions in non-urban communities. This paper focuses on the core problem in P2P…
Stochastic matching is the stochastic version of the well-known matching problem, which consists in maximizing the rewards of a matching under a set of probability distributions associated with the nodes and edges. In most stochastic…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is allowed, that is, each good may be allocated to up to $k$ agents, while incurring a cost for sharing. While classic maximin share (MMS) allocations may not…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
Biased stochastic estimators, such as finite-differences for noisy gradient estimation, often contain parameters that need to be properly chosen to balance impacts from the bias and the variance. While the optimal order of these parameters…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We consider the stability of matchings when individuals strategically submit preference information to a publicly known algorithm. Most pure Nash equilibria of the ensuing game yield a matching that is unstable with respect to the…