Related papers: AJAR: Adaptive Jailbreak Architecture for Red-team…
Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. However, malicious agents in MAS may inject misinformation…
Machine learning (ML) underpins foundation models in finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure, making them targets for data poisoning, model extraction, prompt injection, automated jailbreaking, and preference-guided black-box…
As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and…
This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt…
As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in diverse applications, including chatbot assistants and code generation, aligning their behavior with safety and ethical standards has become paramount. However, jailbreak attacks,…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have been widely deployed across various applications, yet their potential security and ethical risks have raised increasing concerns. Existing research employs red teaming evaluations, utilizing multi-turn…
We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic…
The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous…
As artificial intelligence systems evolve from passive assistants into autonomous agents capable of executing consequential actions, the security boundary shifts from model outputs to tool execution. Traditional security paradigms - log…
We present MultiBreak, a scalable and diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark to evaluate large language model (LLM) safety. Multi-turn jailbreaks mimic natural conversational settings, making them easier to bypass safety-aligned LLM than…
Safety alignment is critical for the responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted to scale model capacity, understanding their safety robustness becomes…
Large-language-model (LLM) agents exhibit complex, context-sensitive behaviour that quickly renders static benchmarks and ad-hoc manual testing obsolete. We present Neo, a configurable, multi-agent framework that automates realistic,…
Recent advancements in adversarial jailbreak attacks have exposed critical vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs), enabling the circumvention of alignment safeguards through increasingly sophisticated prompt manipulations. Our…
Automated intrusion-style workflows require LLM agents to reason over partial observations, tool outputs, and executable artifacts under bounded budgets. A single LLM instance often compresses evidence extraction, planning, execution, and…
LLM multi-agent systems often coordinate through natural-language dialogue or loosely structured shared memory, making intermediate state difficult to validate, attribute, and audit. We introduce PatchBoard, a schema-grounded collaboration…
Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch --…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have improved programming efficiency, but their performance degrades significantly as requirements scale; when faced with multi-modal documents containing hundreds of scenarios, LLMs often produce incorrect…
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive performance and have been put into practical use in commercial applications, but they still have potential safety mechanism vulnerabilities. Jailbreak attacks are red teaming…
Jailbreak techniques for large language models (LLMs) evolve faster than benchmarks, making robustness estimates stale and difficult to compare across papers due to drift in datasets, harnesses, and judging protocols. We introduce JAILBREAK…
Despite extensive efforts in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Activation steering offers a training-free defense method but relies on fixed steering coefficients, resulting in suboptimal…