Related papers: Credible Nash Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Tr…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Securely and efficiently procuring energy balancing services in distribution networks remains challenging, especially within a privacy-preserving environment. This paper proposes a network-constrained demand response game, i.e., a…
We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
A combinatorial trade is a pair of sets of blocks of elements that can be exchanged while preserving relevant subset intersection constraints. The class of balanced and swap-robust minimal trades was proposed in [1] for exchanging blocks of…
Integrated hydrogen-enriched compressed natural gas (HCNG) and active distribution network (ADN) is providing efficient and sustainable flexibility for consuming renewable energies. Yet, cross-sector privacy and uncertain high-renewable…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs between two well-studied measures of fairness and efficiency --…
We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by each borrowing bank is within the interest rate corridor set…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
Demand response has been a promising solution for accommodating renewable energy in power systems. In this study, we consider a demand response scheme within a distribution network facing an energy supply deficit. The utility company…
The question about fair income inequality has been an important open question in economics and in political philosophy for over two centuries with only qualitative answers such as the ones suggested by Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin. We…
We solve the two-player bargaining problem employing Weber's law in psychophysics, which is applied to the perception of utility changes. Using this law, the players define the jointly acceptable range of utilities on the Pareto line, which…
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…
Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market…