Related papers: Credible Nash Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Tr…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…

We consider two market designs for a network of prosumers, trading energy: (i) a centralized design which acts as a benchmark, and (ii) a peer-to-peer market design. High renewable energy penetration requires that the energy market design…

We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…

Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…

This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users…

We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…

A fundamental problem for electronic commerce is the buying and selling of digital goods between individuals that may not know or trust each other. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed by the use of trusted third-parties such as…

Decarbonization of power systems plays a crucial role in achieving carbon neutral goals across the globe, but there exists a sharp contradiction between the emission reduction and levelized generation cost. Therefore, it is of great…

With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream…

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…

Given two finite ordered sets $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ and $B = \{b_1, \ldots, b_n\}$, introduce the set of $m n$ outcomes of the game $O = \{(a, b) \mid a \in A, b \in B\} = \{(a_i, b_j) \mid i \in I = \{1, \ldots, m\}, j \in J = \{1,…

We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this setting, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market.…

Within a common arbitrage-free semimartingale financial market we consider the problem of determining all Nash equilibrium investment strategies for $n$ agents who try to maximize the expected utility of their relative wealth. The utility…

We consider a repeatedly played generalized Nash equilibrium game. This induces a multi-agent online learning problem with joint constraints. An important challenge in this setting is that the feasible set for each agent depends on the…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

The current framework of Internet interconnections, based on transit and settlement-free peering relations, has systemic problems that often cause peering disputes. We propose a new techno-economic interconnection framework called…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

There has been much work on exhibiting mechanisms that implement various bargaining solutions, in particular, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution \cite{moulin1984implementing} and the Nash Bargaining solution. Another well-known and…

We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly…