Related papers: The value of random zero-sum games

We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…

The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…

In this paper, we study a theoretical math problem of game theory and calculus of variations in which we minimize a functional involving two players. A general relationship between the optimal strategies for both players is presented,…

This paper is devoted to finite horizon deterministic mean field games in which the state space is a network. The agents control their velocity, and when they occupy a vertex, they can enter into any incident edge. The running and terminal…

Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2.5-player zero-sum graph games with a reachability objective. The problem is to compute the winning probability as well as the optimal strategies of both players. In this paper, we compare the three…

The theory of mean field games aims at studying deterministic or stochastic differential games (Nash equilibria) as the number of agents tends to infinity. Since very few mean field games have explicit or semi-explicit solutions, numerical…

We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…

We present a randomized primal-dual algorithm that solves the problem $\min_{x} \max_{y} y^\top A x$ to additive error $\epsilon$ in time $\mathrm{nnz}(A) + \sqrt{\mathrm{nnz}(A)n}/\epsilon$, for matrix $A$ with larger dimension $n$ and…

We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…

Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration (VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in the limit. Since no stopping criterion is…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…

We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…

We consider a zero sum differential game with lack of observation on one side. The initial state of the system is drawn at random according to some probability $\mu_0$ on $\R^N$. Player-I is informed of the initial position of state while…

We consider zero sum stochastic games. For every discount factor $\lambda$, a time normalization allows to represent the game as being played on the interval [0, 1]. We introduce the trajectories of cumulated expected payoff and of…

A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. One of the major approaches to analyzing games in combinatorial game theory is to break down a given game position into a disjunctive sum of multiple…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We study a game where one player selects a random function, and the other has to guess that function, and show that with high probability the second player can correctly guess most of the random function. We apply this analysis to…

Shapley's discounted stochastic games, Everett's recursive games and Gillette's undiscounted stochastic games are classical models of game theory describing two-player zero-sum games of potentially infinite duration. We describe algorithms…

In a zero-sum stochastic game, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by them and by a controlled random variable representing the state of nature. The total payoff is the normalized…