Related papers: Improved lower bounds for the maximum size of Cond…
Condorcet domains are fundamental objects in the theory of majority voting; they are sets of linear orders with the property that if every voter picks a linear order from this set, assuming that the number of voters is odd, and alternatives…
In this paper we give the first explicit enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on $n\leq 7$ alternatives. This has been accomplished by developing a new algorithm for constructing Condorcet domains, and an implementation of that…
The study of large Condorcet domains (CD) has been a significant area of interest in voting theory. In this paper, our goal is to search for large CDs that are hitherto unknown. With a straightforward combinatorial definition, searching for…
In this note, we report on a record-breaking Condorcet domain (CD) for n=8 alternatives. We show that there exists a CD of size 224, which is optimal and essentially unique (up to isomorphism). If we consider the underlying permutations and…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
In this paper, we introduce the class of bipartite peak-pit domains. This is a class of Condorcet domains which include both the classical single-peaked and single-dipped domains. Our class of domains can be used to model situations where…
Inspecting known maximal Condorcet domains on 4 variables classified by Tobias Dittrich we find that 9 out of 18 of them are created using a certain composition of smaller domains. In this paper we describe this composition. We give…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters belong to this set, the majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, such domain can be assumed to…
A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which satisfy an acyclic majority relation. In this paper we describe domains as collections of directed Hamilton paths. We prove that while Black's single-peaked domains are defined by…
A Condorcet domain (CD) is a collection of linear orders on a set of candidates satisfying the following property: for any choice of preferences of voters from this collection, a simple majority rule does not yield cycles. We propose a…
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet…
In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
Condorcet winning sets are a set-valued generalization of the well-known concept of a Condorcet winner. As supersets of Condorcet winning sets are always Condorcet winning sets themselves, an interesting property of preference profiles is…
A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known…
A Condorcet winning set addresses the Condorcet paradox by selecting a few candidates--rather than a single winner--such that no unselected alternative is preferred to all of them by a majority of voters. This idea extends to…
In this paper we consider a Condorcet domain (CD) formed by a rhombus tiling as a voting design and consider a problem of aggregation of voting designs using majority rule. A Condorcet super-domain is a collection of CDs obtained from…
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…