Related papers: The Optimal Sample Complexity of Linear Contracts
We consider an online version of the well-studied network utility maximization problem, where users arrive one by one and an operator makes irrevocable decisions for each user without knowing the details of future arrivals. We propose a…
We investigate the problem of best policy identification in discounted linear Markov Decision Processes in the fixed confidence setting under a generative model. We first derive an instance-specific lower bound on the expected number of…
Linearized models of power systems are often desirable to formulate tractable control and optimization problems that still reflect real-world physics adequately under various operating conditions. In this paper, we propose an approach that…
We study the performance of the Empirical Revenue Maximizing (ERM) mechanism in a single-item, single-seller, single-buyer setting. We assume the buyer's valuation is drawn from a regular distribution $F$ and that the seller has access to…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
We consider a symmetric mixture of linear regressions with random samples from the pairwise comparison design, which can be seen as a noisy version of a type of Euclidean distance geometry problem. We analyze the expectation-maximization…
F-measures are popular performance metrics, particularly for tasks with imbalanced data sets. Algorithms for learning to maximize F-measures follow two approaches: the empirical utility maximization (EUM) approach learns a classifier having…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated…
What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…
We model equilibrium allocations in a distribution network as the solution of a linear program (LP) which minimizes the cost of unserved demands across nodes in the network. The constraints in the LP dictate that once a given node's supply…
A natural optimization model that formulates many online resource allocation and revenue management problems is the online linear program (LP) in which the constraint matrix is revealed column by column along with the corresponding…
Social and real-world considerations such as robustness, fairness, social welfare and multi-agent tradeoffs have given rise to multi-distribution learning paradigms, such as collaborative learning, group distributionally robust…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
We study the problem of maximising terminal utility for an agent facing model uncertainty, in a frictionless discrete-time market with one safe asset and finitely many risky assets. We show that an optimal investment strategy exists if the…
Given a collection of feature maps indexed by a set $\mathcal{T}$, we study the performance of empirical risk minimization (ERM) on regression problems with square loss over the union of the linear classes induced by these feature maps.…
We consider a data analyst's problem of purchasing data from strategic agents to compute an unbiased estimate of a statistic of interest. Agents incur private costs to reveal their data and the costs can be arbitrarily correlated with their…
In complex systems, it is quite common to resort to approximations when optimizing system performance. These approximations typically involve selecting a particular system parameter and then studying the performance of the system as this…
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the…
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with…