Related papers: Determining Blockchain Transaction Timing and Fee …

We consider the execution of smart contracts on Bitcoin. There, every contract step corresponds to appending to the blockchain a new transaction that spends the output representing the old contract state, creating a new one for the updated…

In this paper, we provide a novel dynamic decision method of blockchain selfish mining by applying the sensitivity-based optimization theory. Our aim is to find the optimal dynamic blockchain-pegged policy of the dishonest mining pool. To…

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. Our aim is to leverage this parameter to…

The functioning of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin relies on the open availability of the entire history of its transactions. This makes it a particularly interesting socio-economic system to analyse from the point of view of network science.…

The increasing adoption of cryptocurrencies has significantly amplified the resource requirements for operating full nodes, creating substantial barriers to entry. Unlike miners, who are financially incentivized through block rewards and…

We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this…

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…

Blockchain technology, with implications in the financial domain, offers data in the form of large-scale transaction networks. Analyzing transaction networks facilitates fraud detection, market analysis, and supports government regulation.…

For preserving privacy, blockchains can be equipped with dedicated mechanisms to anonymize participants. However, these mechanism often take only the abstraction layer of blockchains into account whereas observations of the underlying…

Distributed ledger systems, such as blockchains, rely on consensus protocols that commit ordered messages for processing. In practice, message ordering within these systems is often reward-driven. This raises concerns about fairness,…

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive on blockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulation of transaction execution order and strategic issuance of profit-generation transactions. We…

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have seen on the rise in their popularity and value, making them a target to several forms of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and calling for a better understanding of their attack…

Transaction fee prediction in Bitcoin's ecosystem represents a crucial challenge affecting both user costs and miner revenue optimization. This study presents a systematic evaluation of six predictive models for forecasting Bitcoin…

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer…

Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) is a rapidly proliferating e-commerce model, offering consumers to get the product immediately and defer payments. Meanwhile, emerging blockchain technologies endow BNPL platforms with digital currency transactions,…

Ethereum's Gas mechanism attempts to set transaction fees in accordance with the computational cost of transaction execution: a cost borne by default by every node on the network to ensure correct smart contract execution. Gas encourages…

Public blockchains have spurred the growing popularity of decentralized transactions and smart contracts, but they exhibit limitations on the transaction throughput, storage, and computation. To avoid transaction gridlock, public…

In this paper, we study an investor's optimal entry and exit decisions in a liquid staking protocol (LSP) and an automated market maker (AMM), primarily from the standpoint of the investor. Our analysis focuses on two key investor actions:…

We study the following problem that is motivated by Blockchains where ``miners'' are serially given the monopoly for assembling transactions into the next block. Our model has a single good that is sold repeatedly every day where new demand…

Blockchain solutions typically assume a synchronous network to ensure consistency and achieve consensus. In contrast, offline transaction systems aim to enable users to agree on and execute transactions without assuming bounded…