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Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-01-25 Sankarshan Damle , Manisha Padala , Sujit Gujar

Payment channel networks (PCNs) have emerged as a scalability solution for blockchains built on the concept of a payment channel: a setting that allows two nodes to safely transact between themselves in high frequencies based on…

Systems and Control · Electrical Eng. & Systems 2021-04-01 Nikolaos Papadis , Leandros Tassiulas

Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , David C. Parkes

Blockchain offers a decentralized, immutable, transparent system of records. It offers a peer-to-peer network of nodes with no centralised governing entity making it unhackable and therefore, more secure than the traditional paper-based or…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-11-27 Harsh Jot Singh , Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-01-23 Soumya Basu , David Easley , Maureen O'Hara , Emin Gün Sirer

Blockchain systems are being used in a wide range of application domains. They can support trusted transactions in time critical applications. In this paper, we study how miners should pick up transactions from a transaction pool so as to…

Performance · Computer Science 2020-11-24 Gholamreza Ramezan , Cyril Leung , Chunyan Miao

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

We study the probabilistic distribution of the confirmation time of Bitcoin transactions, conditional on the current memory pool (i.e., the queue of transactions awaiting confirmation). The results of this paper are particularly interesting…

Performance · Computer Science 2018-10-22 David Koops

Blockchain and blockchain-inspired decentralized applications are on the rise thanks to their unique characteristics such as their decentralized nature, anonymity, and tamper-proof nature; however, blockchain transactions tend to experience…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-08 Yi Lyu

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-04 Maryam Bahrani , Pranav Garimidi , Tim Roughgarden

Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In early blockchain protocols, this scarcity was resolved through…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-12-16 Stefanos Leonardos , Daniël Reijsbergen , Barnabé Monnot , Georgios Piliouras

Blockchain's economic value lies in enabling financial and economic transactions without relying on trusted, centralized intermediaries. In practice, however, transactions pass through a fragmented chain of intermediaries before being…

General Economics · Economics 2026-05-05 Andrea Canidio , Vabuk Pahari

The security of Bitcoin protocols is deeply dependent on the incentives provided to miners, which come from a combination of block rewards and transaction fees. As Bitcoin experiences more halving events, the protocol reward converges to…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-09-12 Roozbeh Sarenche , Alireza Aghabagherloo , Svetla Nikova , Bart Preneel

Blockchain technology is widely expected to reduce transaction costs by automating contract enforcement and eliminating intermediaries; yet, the execution costs imposed by network congestion have received little attention in the operations…

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. In particular, we show that the average welfare gap between…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-05-21 Guillermo Angeris , Theo Diamandis , Ciamac Moallemi

Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-08-11 Bahar Acilan , Andrei Constantinescu , Lioba Heimbach , Roger Wattenhofer

In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, more…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-05-25 Johnnatan Messias , Vabuk Pahari , Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran , Krishna P. Gummadi , Patrick Loiseau

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-06-08 Stefanos Leonardos , Barnabé Monnot , Daniël Reijsbergen , Stratis Skoulakis , Georgios Piliouras

In this paper, we review the undercutting attacks in the transaction-fee-based regime of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains with the longest chain fork-choice rule. Next, we focus on the problem of fluctuations in mining revenue and the mining…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-02-13 Rastislav Budinský , Ivan Homoliak , Ivana Stančíková

Modern blockchains increasingly rely on parallel execution to improve throughput. We show several industry and academic transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) struggle to simultaneously account for execution parallelism while remaining…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-07 Sarisht Wadhwa , Aviv Yaish , Fan Zhang , Kartik Nayak