Related papers: Behavioral patterns and mean-field games in epidem…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
We consider the spread of infectious diseases through a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model with social structure, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. In our game…
This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related…
In this paper, we develop a mean-field game model for SEIR epidemics on heterogeneous contact networks, where individuals choose state-dependent contact effort to balance infection losses against the social and economic costs of isolation.…
The spread of an epidemic disease and the population's collective behavioural response are deeply intertwined, influencing each other's evolution. Such a co-evolution typically has been overlooked in mathematical models, limiting their…
We propose a model, which nests a susceptible-infected-recovered-deceased (SIRD) epidemic model into a dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium framework with agents' mobility. The latter affect both their income and their probability of infecting…
Epidemiological models increasingly rely on self-reported behavioral data such as vaccination status, mask usage, and social distancing adherence to forecast disease transmission and assess the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions…
Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractable to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial…
The recent COVID-19 pandemic has led to an increasing interest in the modeling and analysis of infectious diseases. The pandemic has made a significant impact on the way we behave and interact in our daily life. The past year has witnessed…
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for…
Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…
The spreading dynamics of an epidemic and the collective behavioral pattern of the population over which it spreads are deeply intertwined and the latter can critically shape the outcome of the former. Motivated by this, we design a…
Individuals change their behavior during an epidemic in response to whether they and/or those they interact with are healthy or sick. Healthy individuals are concerned about contracting a disease from their sick contacts and may utilize…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
In this manuscript we present several possible ways of modeling human capital accumulation during the spread of a disease following an agent based approach, where agents behave maximizing their intertemporal utility. We assume that the…
We study a game-theoretic model of epidemic control in a large population with finitely many groups and non-cooperative individuals. In the model, individuals jointly choose their socialization levels and vaccination rates, and vaccination…
Faced with a dangerous epidemic humans will spontaneously social distance to reduce their risk of infection at a socio-economic cost. Compartmentalised epidemic models have been extended to include this endogenous decision making:…
We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is…