Related papers: Fair Team Contracts
We present a continuous-time contract whereby a top-level player can incentivize a hierarchy of players below him to act in his best interest despite only observing the output of his direct subordinate. This paper extends Sannikov's…
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods across groups of agents, where each agent fully enjoys all goods allocated to their group. We focus on groups of two (couples) and other groups of small size. For two couples, an EF1…
We introduce the General Incentives-based Framework for Fairness (GIFF), a novel approach for fair multi-agent resource allocation that infers fair decision-making from standard value functions. In resource-constrained settings, agents…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced exploration of different a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in the long-term welfare of a population of agents who arrive one by one in a multi-armed bandit…
We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained…
This paper studies a dynamic screening model in which a principal hires an agent with limited liability. The agent's private cost of working is an i.i.d. draw from a continuous distribution. His working status is publicly observable. The…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
As freelancing work keeps on growing almost everywhere due to a sharp decrease in communication costs and to the widespread of Internet-based labour marketplaces (e.g., guru.com, feelancer.com, mturk.com, upwork.com), many researchers and…
As mobile traffic is dominated by content services (e.g., video), which typically use recommendation systems, the paradigm of network-friendly recommendations (NFR) has been proposed recently to boost the network performance by promoting…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning…
Collaborative fairness stands as an essential element in federated learning to encourage client participation by equitably distributing rewards based on individual contributions. Existing methods primarily focus on adjusting gradient…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…