Related papers: Timing-Aware Two-Player Stochastic Games with Self…
Control theory plays a pivotal role in understanding and optimizing the behavior of complex dynamical systems across various scientific and engineering disciplines. Two key frameworks that have emerged for modeling and solving control…
This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1…
Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…
In this article, we are interested in planning problems where the agent is aware of the presence of an observer, and where this observer is in a partial observability situation. The agent has to choose its strategy so as to optimize the…
We introduce a formalism modelling communication of distributed agents strictly in continuous-time. Within this framework, we study the problem of synthesising local strategies for individual agents such that a specified set of goal states…
The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the other…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
The partial monitoring (PM) framework provides a theoretical formulation of sequential learning problems with incomplete feedback. On each round, a learning agent plays an action while the environment simultaneously chooses an outcome. The…
We establish the existence of optimal scheduling strategies for time-bounded reachability in continuous-time Markov decision processes, and of co-optimal strategies for continuous-time Markov games. Furthermore, we show that optimal control…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We…
This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…
This paper considers the control of uncertain systems that are operated under limited resource factors, such as battery life or hardware longevity. We consider here resource-aware self-triggered control techniques that schedule system…
We consider the problem of computing the set of initial states of a dynamical system such that there exists a control strategy to ensure that the trajectories satisfy a temporal logic specification with probability 1 (almost-surely). We…
We consider a non-cooperative constrained stochastic games with N players with the following special structure. With each player there is an associated controlled Markov chain. The transition probabilities of the i-th Markov chain depend…