Related papers: Comparing the Fairness of Recursively Balanced Pic…
We study several fairness notions in allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive values) to agents who have additive and submodular cost functions. The fairness criteria we are concern with are envy-free up to any item…
Many large-scale recommender systems consist of two stages. The first stage efficiently screens the complete pool of items for a small subset of promising candidates, from which the second-stage model curates the final recommendations. In…
A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…
We investigate fairness in the allocation of indivisible items among groups of agents using the notion of maximin share (MMS). While previous work has shown that no nontrivial multiplicative MMS approximation can be guaranteed in this…
We study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a group of agents, where each agent $i$ has a non-negative weight $w_i$ that represents its obligation for undertaking the chores. We consider the fairness notion of weighted…
With fairness concerns gaining significant attention in Machine Learning (ML), several bias mitigation techniques have been proposed, often compared against each other to find the best method. These benchmarking efforts tend to use a common…
New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…
In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We consider the problem of designing a fair scheduling algorithm for discrete-time constrained queuing networks. Each queue has dedicated exogenous packet arrivals. There are constraints on which queues can be served simultaneously. This…
Rankings on online platforms help their end-users find the relevant information -- people, news, media, and products -- quickly. Fair ranking tasks, which ask to rank a set of items to maximize utility subject to satisfying group-fairness…
Recent research found that fairness plays a key role in customer satisfaction. Therefore, many manufacturing and services industries have become aware of the need to treat customers fairly. Still, there is a huge lack of models that enable…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted…
We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the…
We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several settings. Specifically, in the case where only the buyer…
Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. We study the case where m indivisible items need to be divided among n agents with…