Related papers: Deterministic implementation in single-item auctio…
Is incentive compatibility still necessary for implementation if we relax the rational expectations assumption? This paper proposes a generalized model of implementation that does not assume agents hold rational expectations and…
Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these…
We study a model of dynamic combinatorial assignment of indivisible objects without money. We introduce a new solution concept called ``dynamic approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes'' (DACEEI), which stipulates that markets…
We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding…
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if the bidders valuation functions are submodular over…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable…
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in…
We study the revenue comparison problem of auctions when the seller has a maxmin expected utility preference. The seller holds a set of priors around some reference belief, interpreted as an approximating model of the true probability law…
We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-crossing domains. Single-crossing domains were extensively studied in the economics literature. Roughly speaking, a domain is single crossing if…
Cluster-based randomized experiments are popular designs for mitigating the bias of standard estimators when interference is present and classical causal inference and experimental design assumptions (such as SUTVA or ITR) do not hold.…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. These allocation and…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the…
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms,…