Related papers: Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequ…

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker.…

Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…

Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…

We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…

This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…

Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…

Moving target defense has emerged as a critical paradigm of protecting a vulnerable system against persistent and stealthy attacks. To protect a system, a defender proactively changes the system configurations to limit the exposure of…

The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

Defending against sophisticated cyber threats demands strategic allocation of limited security resources across complex network infrastructures. When the defender has limited defensive resources, the complexity of coordinating honeypot…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the…

This work introduces the dynamic Defender-Attacker Blotto (dDAB) game, extending the classical static Blotto game to a dynamic resource allocation setting over graphs. In the dDAB game, a defender is required to maintain numerical…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…