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High-frequency trading, in both traditional and decentralized markets, induces latency races and redundant order flow as traders spend resources to win time-sensitive opportunities. We show that auctioning artificial time priority can…
We propose a novel framework to analyse the velocity of money in terms of the contribution (MicroVelocity) of each individual agent, and to uncover the distributional determinants of aggregate velocity. Leveraging on complete publicly…
The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control play an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized…
We discuss the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in this work. In our setting, the global state, action, and reward are assumed to be fully observable, while the local policy is protected as privacy by each…
In this work, we develop a scalable, local trajectory optimization algorithm that enables robots to interact with other robots. It has been shown that agents' interactions can be successfully captured in game-theoretic formulations, where…
Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute actions in stochastic environments, modeled as Markov decision…
This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the minimal cost of acquisition and maximal efficiency, they…
Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain…
Blockchain technology is a crypto-based secure ledger for data storage and transfer through decentralized, trustless peer-to-peer systems. Despite its advantages, previous studies have shown that the technology is not completely secure…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…
The increasing penetration of renewable energy sources in day-ahead energy markets introduces challenges in balancing supply and demand, ensuring grid resilience, and maintaining trust in decentralized trading systems. This paper proposes a…
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of how diverse token-based reward mechanisms impact platform dynamics and user behaviors. For this, we gather a unique, large-scale dataset from Farcaster. This blockchain-based,…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
The emerging "agentic web" envisions large populations of autonomous agents coordinating, transacting, and delegating across open networks. Yet many agent communication and commerce protocols treat agents as low-cost identities, despite the…
Motivated by the rapid push to decentralize sharing of data, we study whether large-scale data sharing coalitions can form in a decentralized manner under differential privacy when players have heterogeneous privacy preferences. We first…
We consider the multi-period portfolio optimization problem with a single asset that can be held long or short. Due to the presence of transaction costs, maximizing the immediate reward at each period may prove detrimental, as frequent…
There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only…
A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the context of…